Bloomberg reports that export controls will play an increasing role in trade negotiations:
The London meetings showcased the growing role of export controls in modern trade warfare, where access to rare minerals or tiny microchips can give one economy a big edge over a rival. China controls much of the world’s supplies of raw materials used to make magnets and other inputs for advanced manufacturing like electric vehicles, lasers and mobile phones.
There are probably not many people who remember COCOM, the developed countries’ agreement to control exports to the old Soviet Union.
According to Wikipedia:
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was established in 1949[1] at the beginning of the Cold War to coordinate controls on exports from Western Bloc countries to the Soviet Union and its allies. Operating through informal consensus, CoCom maintained extensive control lists covering arms, nuclear materials, and dual-use technologies. However, CoCom faced criticism for weak enforcement and inconsistent application among member states. CoCom officially disbanded on March 31, 1994. However, many of its export restrictions remained in effect among member nations until they were formally replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement in 1996. CoCom’s legacy continues to influence contemporary export control regimes, highlighting its enduring relevance in nonproliferation and technology policy.
Missile Technology Control Regime
A government information website dealing with export restrictions on China, mentions the Missile Technology Control Regime, of which I was one of the creators. While Jimmy Carter was President, some of his foreign policy people decided that they wanted to create a treaty to control missile proliferation, similar to the way the Nuclear Non-Poliferation Treaty (NPT) controlled nuclear proliferation. I was working in the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) on nuclear proliferation, but I agreed to help them on missile proliferation. When Reagan was elected, the Carterites left, but the Reaganites decided that it was an idea worth pursuing. It happened that I was one of the few people in the State Department who knew anything about the issue; so, the Reagan administration asked me to work with them on the issue.
At that time when the NPT was relatively new, there was great resistance to it from the problem countries it was designed to restrain, making it unlikely that they would be willing to agree to a missile proliferation treaty. After looking into a treaty, we decided that it would be more likely to get agreement on a suppliers’ regime controlling exports to problem countries, similar to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group or the Zangger Committee for nuclear-related items.
One of the things we needed was a detailed list of items to be restricted, which required very technical descriptions. I knew that COCOM had such descriptions for exports to the Soviet Union and that they might be a starting point for the MTCR specifications. Thus, I began working with Bill Root, the director of the State Department office handling COCOM. I discovered that there was a lot of disagreement between State and the Pentagon. The Pentagon’s point man on this issue was an assistant secretary of defense named Richard Perle, who was very close to President Reagan, although he was only an assistant secretary. Perle thought the US export controls were too lax and enforced too laxly. The State Department was concerned about getting agreement from the other COCOM members to the changes that Perle wanted to make. I was visiting the State Department COCOM office to go over the COCOM specifications for items that might go on the MTCR list. While we were working, Root got a call from Perle; he asked me to come back after lunch. When I came back, his secretary said he had retired, and his deputy was taking over the office.
We came up with a list and then started a round of consultations with the other G-7 countries — the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada. The proposal was generally well received, but my INR assignment ended shortly afterwards; so, I was not around for the final agreement on the MTCR.